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Abstract 
 
I offer an interpretation and defense of John Dewey's notion of "democratic 
experiments," which involve testing moral beliefs through the experience of acting on 
them on a social scale.  Such testing is crucial, I argue, because our social norms and 
institutions fundamentally shape the relationships through which we develop 
emotional responses that represent the morally significant concerns of others.  
Improving those responses therefore depends on deliberate alterations of our social 
environment.  I consider deliberative and activist alternatives and argue that an 
experimentalist approach better models some prominent cases of social progress, such 
as the extension of marital rights to same-sex couples. 
 
Keywords: John Dewey, Democracy, Pragmatism, Progress, Deliberation, 
Democratic Experiment, Same-Sex Marriage  
 
1. Introduction 
 One notable feature of many episodes of moral progress is that social endorsement 
of the relevant improvements lags significantly behind action aimed at realizing those 
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improvements.1  The case of school desegregation in the United States serves to illustrate 
this nicely.  The landmark Brown v Board of Education decision in 1954 was 
implemented against massive social opposition that only gradually diminished over a 
period of many years.  Likewise, legal measures designed to realize equal opportunity for 
women in the workplace were put in place against the backdrop of overwhelming 
structural sexism.  A similar pattern has emerged more recently in the case of gay rights, 
where support for same-sex marriage (in the United States anyway) has begun to gain 
broad traction only after a series of major legislative and judicial victories. 
 One reason that this phenomenon is interesting is that it seems to be in tension with 
the now predominant deliberative model of democracy.  That model holds, in the most 
general terms, that democratic societies should make decisions about political action by 
engaging in an inclusive exchange of reasons.2  If action precedes endorsement in 
landmark cases of moral progress, however, then that at least seems to put some pressure 
on the idea that exchanging reasons alone is an adequate basis for social change.  In the 
landmark cases just described, after all, the scenario seems to have gone differently: 
people who had good moral ideas tried to convince others, through deliberation, of the 
moral value of a significant social change.  But they couldn’t convince them, or at any 
rate couldn’t convince a large portion of them.  Not heeding their own deliberative 
                                                
1 I am grateful to Ansley Erickson, Brian Wilson, Daniel Groll, Dan Meyers, Daniel Viehoff, 
Jason Decker, Melissa Koenig, Philip Kitcher, and two anonymous referees for valuable feedback 
on various iterations of this paper.  I have also benefited from the input of audiences at the 
University of Minnesota, Carleton College, the Center for Inquiry, Columbia University, and my 
own St. Olaf College, as well as the students in my seminar in Social Epistemology.  Finally, I 
am grateful for generous funding from the Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy 
at Columbia during the earliest development of these ideas. 
2 For classic statements see Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in 
Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions 
to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). 
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failure, they organized what power they could to implement those changes, changes 
which in turn appeared to play a causal role in generating social assent ex post.  
 My proposal below is that we can best understand the achievement of progress in 
such cases by rejecting the deliberative democratic account and instead modeling them as 
instances of what John Dewey conceived as democratic “experiments.”  While Dewey 
recognized an essential role for deliberation in major episodes of moral change, his 
approach diverges in fundamental respects from deliberative democracy.  Crucial to 
Dewey’s notion of democratic experimentation is the pragmatist idea that the experience 
of acting on our moral  beliefs over time – above and beyond deliberation, reflection, and 
communication – has a crucial epistemological role to play in our ability to improve those 
beliefs.  On a Deweyan view, the Brown decision was essential to the broad social 
recognition of blacks’ most basic liberties precisely because it enabled action to respect 
those rights in advance of any deliberative consensus. 
 While I am not the first to pursue a model of democratic experimentation, I offer a 
novel defense and interpretation by focusing on the distinctive significance that Dewey 
attributes to the emotional aspects of moral judgment.3  Testing our moral beliefs in 
                                                
3 Elizabeth Anderson has done very recent work to develop the idea of Deweyan experimentation 
in the democratic context.  I discuss Anderson's view further below.  While there are important 
parallels between our views, Anderson conceives of experiment principally as a process through 
which morally significant expectations about consequences are tested.  In contrast, I focus on the 
transformative properties of emotional experience as a source of epistemological insight.  See 
Elizabeth Anderson, "Dewey's Moral Philosophy," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-moral/ (2014), "Social Movements, 
Experiments in Living, and Moral Progress: Case Studies From Britain's Abolition of Slavery," in 
The Lindley Lecture, Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas (2014), "The Social 
Epistemology of Morality: Learning from the Forgotten History of the Abolition of Slavery," in 
The Epistemic Life of Groups, eds. Miranda Fricker and Michael Brady (New York: Oxford 
University Press, forthcoming).  Philip Kitcher, The Ethical Project (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2011) and Eric MacGilvray, "Experience as Experiment: Some Consequences 
of Pragmatism for Democracy," American Journal of Political Science 43 (1999): 542-65 also 
offer sophisticated and distinct takes on Deweyan experimentation. 
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practice is crucial, I argue, because our social norms and institutions fundamentally shape 
the relationships through which we develop emotional responses that represent the moral 
concerns of others.  Improving those responses therefore hinges in crucial respects on 
practical interventions that alter our social environment.  Democratic conditions are 
essential in this context, I argue, because they facilitate the introduction of experimental 
innovations, and the reliable moral evaluation of them over time.  I thus offer an account 
of democratic social progress that is novel, both in the distinctive epistemological role 
that it attributes to practice, and in the particular connection that it draws between 
practice and moral emotions. 
 Before proceeding any further I should emphasize that, though Dewey is the 
starting point for the account that follows, and though I believe my account is broadly 
consistent with his ideas, my primary aim is not exegetical and, indeed, the view I will 
defend probably differs in some respects from a view that Dewey himself would endorse.  
Instead, I aim to mine some of his core ideas in order to provide the basis for an  account 
that is independently compelling.  
  
2. Dewey’s Epistemology of Experiment 
 In order to get some conceptual foundations in place, I’ll begin with a very 
selective exposition of Dewey’s moral epistemology.  Dewey held the idiosyncratic view 
that moral and other claims of value were “hypotheses” to be tested in the light of 
experience.4  Specifically, they express hypotheses that attempting to realize or respect 
                                                
4 My take on Dewey’s moral epistemology in this section has been significantly aided and 
influenced by the accounts in Anderson, "Dewey's Moral Philosophy," Henry S. Richardson, 
Practical Reasoning About Final Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Robert 
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the value in question will eliminate dissatisfaction or frustration generated by our habitual 
course of proceeding, given full awareness of the consequences of pursuing and realizing 
that value. “Full awareness of consequences” in this case means that we must grasp (a) 
what is involved in realizing the value itself, (b) what means are required to realize the 
value, and (c) the consequences of (a) and (b) for other things that we care about.  Value 
judgments thus subsume broad claims about how the satisfaction associated with 
resolving particular dilemmas comports with the full range of an agent’s concerns under 
particular conditions.5  Our moral worldview matures over time as such claims are 
confirmed and refined under diverse circumstances.  In this way, value judgments evolve 
from mere hypotheses to become settled (or discarded) theories, even as new 
circumstances may always prompt renewed scrutiny.  
 I want to focus here on two features of Dewey’s view that are crucial to the idea of 
democratic experiment.  The first is his rejection of a tidy division between rational and 
affective modes of evaluation.  For Dewey, the emotions play a crucial role in directing 
our attention to objects of value and making them salient in our considerations of what to 
do: 
We, indeed, estimate the import or significance of any present desire or impulse by 
forecasting what it would come or amount to if carried out; literally its 
consequences define its consequence, its meaning and importance.  But if these 
consequences were conceived merely as remote, if their picturing did not at once 
arouse a present sense of peace, of fulfillment, or of dissatisfaction, of 
                                                                                                                                            
B. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1991), and many conversations with Philip Kitcher. 
5 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology (Amherst, NY: 
Prometheus Books, 2002), pp. 172-277, "Theory of Valuation," in The Later Works: 1925-1953, 
ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988) 
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incompletion and irritation, the process of thinking out consequences would 
remain purely intellectual.  It would be as barren of influence upon behavior as the 
mathematical speculations of a disembodied angel.  Any actual experience of 
reflection upon conduct will show that every foreseen result at once stirs our 
present affections, our likes and dislikes, our desires and aversions.  There is 
developed a running commentary which stamps values at once as good or evil.  It 
is this direct sense of value, not the consciousness of general rules or ultimate 
goals, which finally determines the worth of the act to the agent.6 
Thus, deliberation is an experientially textured “imaginative rehearsal of possibilities,”7 
in which our emotional responses to an envisioned course of action are crucial.  Yet, at 
the same time, if our emotional responses are not guided by careful reflection, they 
function simply as blind and incoherent impulses.8  Reason thus involves reflectively 
ordering and refining those responses to make them more coherent and to set them in the 
widest social context:9 “Rationality, once more, is not a force to be evoked against 
impulse and habit.  It is the attainment of a working harmony among diverse desires.”10  
In short, under adequate conditions of reflection, our desires are responsive to our 
rational assessment of the consequences of acting on them.  And, at the same time, our 
rational attitudes about what is best to do reflect a sensitivity to our emotional make-up, 
in effect, the feelings provoked by envisaging a course of action.  
                                                
6 John Dewey and James Hayden Tufts, Ethics (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1929), p. 
323 
7 Ibid, Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 190 
8 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, pp. 190-98, Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, pp. 298-300 
9 Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, pp. 316-17 
10 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 196 
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The second feature of Dewey’s moral epistemology which is crucial to the idea of 
democratic experimentation is his emphasis on the social character of moral values and, 
thus, the essential role that social institutions and interactions play in shaping those 
values:  
“The social environment may be as artificial as you please.  But its action in 
response to ours is natural not artificial.  In language and imagination we rehearse 
the response of others just as we dramatically enact other consequences.  We 
foreknow how others will act, and the foreknowledge is the beginning of 
judgment passed on action.  We know with them; there is conscience.  An 
assembly is formed within our breast which discusses and appraises proposed and 
performed acts.  The community without becomes a forum and tribunal within, a 
judgment-seat of charges, assessments and exculpations.  Our thoughts of our 
own actions are saturated with the ideas that others entertain about them, ideas 
which have been expressed not only in explicit instruction but still more 
effectively in reaction to our acts.”11    
Thus, questions of value are social because they are “saturated” with the perspective of 
the community in which we live, and because they are shaped by a regard for that 
perspective. Indeed, Dewey thinks that we cannot so much as understand the thoughts 
and behavior of individuals independently of her social environment:  “The individual 
par excellence is moved and regulated by his associations with others; what he does and 
                                                
11 Ibid., p. 315 
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what the consequences of his behavior are, what his experience consists of, cannot even 
be described, much less accounted for, in isolation.”12 
Given the inherently social character of values, inquiry into values – moral or 
otherwise – is not adequate without a full regard for how our own desires, beliefs, and 
practices interact with the desires, beliefs, and practices of others.  That is why the pursuit 
of “satisfaction” is not an egoistic or utilitarian enterprise.  Deweyan satisfaction is best 
understood as a form of carefully considered, socially informed endorsement that 
responds to diverse manifestations of value rather than a singular kind of pleasure or 
positive feeling.13 Moral inquiry thus entails going beyond immediate popular sentiment 
to achieve demanding conditions of information, reflection, and social engagement. 
Dewey’s emphasis on the social character of moral inquiry also leads him to 
argue that it requires democracy.  Crucially, Deweyan democracy consists, not merely in 
a set of procedures for decision-making, but in the “idea of community life itself,”14 
where citizens are brought regularly into contact with the desires, beliefs, and practices of 
others across a broad spectrum of civic and social engagement. Deweyan democracy thus 
plays out, not only in voting booths and town hall meetings, but also in the workplace, in 
civic and recreational organizations, and especially schools.15  
 Dewey’s notion that value judgments express hypotheses in turn leads naturally to 
the suggestion that democracy might recruit the method of “experimental intelligence” in 
some way that parallels or resembles the scientific method.16  Though the 
                                                
12 John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Chicago: Swallow Press, 1954), p. 188 
13 Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, pp. 301-03, Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, pp. 199-209 
14 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 148 
15 Ibid, John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education 
(New York: Free Press, 1944) 
16 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, pp. 202-03 
Michael Fuerstein, “Democratic Experiments” 
 9 
morality/science analogy evidently has significant limits, the core of the idea for Dewey 
is that moral ideals, like scientific theories, should be susceptible to revision in the light 
of experience based on “constant and well-equipped observation of the consequences 
they entail when acted upon.”17  Experimentation involves “…institution of a definite and 
specified course of change.  The method of physical inquiry is to introduce some change 
in order to see what other change ensues...18  This provides a plausible and 
straightforward way of thinking about experimentation in a more general sense: 
experimentation involves intervening in the environment to initiate change in ways 
deliberately designed to serve epistemological objectives.  And since moral values are 
social, they become settled when their projections of consequences are confirmed by 
diverse individuals under conditions of open inquiry over time.  Through that process, a 
body of core commitments emerges (our commitment to basic forms of freedom and 
equality, for example) that become increasingly immune to legitimate social contestation, 
even as the important work of interpreting those commitments carries on. 
Here is a first pass, then, at the idea of democratic experiments.  Democratic 
experiments involve deliberate interventions in our habitual social practices, under 
broadly democratic conditions, that aim to discover how to resolve some socially present 
objection to the status quo.  The germ of those interventions is the durable experience of 
moral dissatisfaction within some corner of society, and they are thus governed by a 
particular hypothesis about how changes in social practice would successfully resolve 
that dissatisfaction within a sufficiently informed and engaged citizenry.  
                                                
17 Ibid., p. 203 
18 John Dewey, "The Quest for Certainty," in The Later Works: 1925-1953, ed. Jo Ann Boydston 
(Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), p. 68 
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  Consistent with Dewey’s capacious notion of democracy, the phrase “broadly 
democratic conditions” refers to a form of social and political organization which (in the 
ideal) involves: (a) some core set of meaningful (at least in the aggregate) and equitably 
distributed rights to exercise control over political decision-making; (b) robust 
protections for a conventional package of civil liberties, including freedoms of speech, 
association, conscience, and political participation; and importantly (c) institutions that 
enable the meaningful participation of citizens across the social spectrum in varied 
dimensions of public life.  While (a) conventionally implies significant measures of 
majority or plurality voting, I also take it to be compatible with elements of technocracy, 
judicial review, and constitutional limitation (this point is important to my argument, as 
becomes clear later on).  In Sections 3 and 4, I examine in detail the manner in which the 
dissatisfaction of a minority might translate into changes that upset the status quo.  For 
now, though, I’ll observe briefly that democracies as just defined tend to facilitate that 
kind of translation, both by distributing basic social and political powers equitably, and 
by enabling social interactions that foster a measure of sympathetic responsiveness to 
other kinds of people.  More than any other form of social organization, democracies are 
engineered to make valid grievances identifiable, expressible, and actionable enough to 
instigate a measure of change. 
But before developing that theme further, I want to focus on what is perhaps a 
more fundamental question: Why experiment?  More specifically: how does 
experimentation better put us in a position to make better justified endorsements of our 
moral beliefs?  My proposed answer hinges on the two crucial features of Dewey’s moral 
epistemology identified above: interventions in practice, I will argue, are crucial to 
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improving the emotional and social capacities through which we represent the concerns 
of others.  To make that case, I begin with an example. 
In her reconstruction of the British abolitionist movement in the 18th and 19th 
Centuries, Elizabeth Anderson pursues Dewey’s suggestion that experimental moral 
practice enables us to expose false assumptions about the consequences of realizing our 
moral beliefs.  Prior to emancipation, she notes, it had been assumed that absent coercion, 
slaves would not be motivated to work beyond subsistence levels, thus fundamentally 
threatening the economic engine of social progress.  The actual practice of emancipation, 
however, revealed both that economic incentives alone could induce sufficient 
productivity and also that, with greater industrialization, economic prosperity was far less 
dependent on the particular form of low-skilled agricultural labor that slaves provided.19  
While the economic inferiority of slavery does not entail its moral inferiority, Anderson 
observes that the fear that emancipation would undermine productivity was substantially 
premised on the notion that blacks were naturally lazy and indifferent to the value of 
life’s pleasures beyond bare subsistence.20  Thus, to demonstrate the economic 
sustainability of free labor was also to reveal the way in which the morally and socially 
relevant character traits of workers were artifacts of an oppressive economic system 
rather than natural racial properties.  The judgment of free labor’s moral righteousness, in 
this respect, emerges from a historical transition in which all workers come to be seen as 
equal bearers of fundamental moral agency.  Free labor thus comes to be understood as 
an intrinsic moral good that transcends assessments of economic value.   
                                                
19 Anderson, "Social Movements, Experiments in Living, and Moral Progress: Case Studies From 
Britain's Abolition of Slavery" 
20 Ibid., pp. 19-20 
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 Given that abolition emerged from highly non-democratic conditions, it does not 
yet exemplify democratic experimentation in the full sense.  It nonetheless reveals the 
way in which our expectations about the consequences of acting on moral beliefs are 
often tightly coupled to representations of the morally significant traits of others around 
us.  Because of this close relationship, social interventions that upset such expectations 
can often change our moralized representations of others, and thus our conception of 
what is morally valuable.  But to fully understand how this sort of process works, I want 
to suggest that we must look more closely at the psychological and social mechanisms by 
which our moralized representations of others are formed.  For that purpose, let us return 
to some crucial features of Dewey’s moral epistemology.   
As I noted earlier, Dewey sees our moral judgments as involving both rational and 
affective modes of evaluation.  Those judgments are socially informed, he suggests, 
insofar as this sort of experience is “saturated” with the perspective of others, i.e., 
informed by a full regard for what matters to those around us.  Crucially, this suggests 
that the value of novel experience lies, not only in its tendency to yield rationally 
significant information about consequences, but also in its capacity to educate our 
emotional responses to those consequences, and specifically those responses that allow us 
adequately to represent the concerns of others in our social environment.  In the case of 
abolition, the point is that the tendency of whites to disregard the moral evils associated 
with slavery was in large part a consequence of the kinds of shallow, degrading, and 
objectifying relationships with blacks that the practice of slavery itself perpetuated.21  To 
end the practice of slavery was thus also to (begin to) create a context for the kinds of 
                                                
21 Kitcher, The Ethical Project, pp. 153-62 
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substantive social interaction that sustain more veridical and sympathetic representations 
of blacks.  Over time, those representations became more sympathetic in the sense that 
they gave greater moral weight and salience to the perspective of blacks as weighed 
against their own.  In that way they better attuned whites to the proper status of blacks as 
moral equals, and made them less inclined to dismiss their perspective without due 
consideration.  Likewise, over time, their representations became more veridical insofar 
as whites became appropriately sensitive to a fuller range of morally relevant 
considerations.  Abolition, in other words, fostered an epistemological improvement via 
conditions in which whites could begin to feel and think more appropriately about the 
consequences of racial inequality. 
To pursue this point further, consider the case of same-sex marriage which, like 
abolition, can be modeled as a paradigm instance of democratic experimentation.  Those 
alive in the 2015 United States have lived through an extended period in which there has 
been a notable rise in traditional family structures within the gay community, most 
notably including marital unions and child-rearing.  One consequence of this has been 
evidence against the dire consequences of same-sex marriage predicted by many of its 
opponents.22  But as the practice of homosexual family identity has expanded, 
heterosexual Americans have also had expanding (though still highly variable and, in 
many places, quite limited) opportunities for meaningful and transparent interaction with 
homosexuals and homosexual families. I say “transparent” here because the crucial point 
is not just that heterosexuals can interact with members of same-sex families, but also 
that the gay identity of those with whom they interact is openly expressed and thus 
                                                
22 "American Psychological Association: Amici Curiae Brief, In re Marriage Cases," 
http://www.apa.org/about/offices/ogc/amicus/obergefell-supreme-court.pdf. 
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represented in their experience.23 The opportunities I have in mind encompass all the 
diverse forums in which social interactions take place: neighborhoods, dining halls, 
public parks, school events, religious and political meetings, and so forth.  The 
consequence of this has been the gradual formation of new social relationships 
(friendships, collegial working relationships, neighborly connections, passing social 
contact) that would previously have been impossible, at least when understood qua 
relationships with members of same-sex families. 
Although the social shift I am describing here is still very new, we can 
nonetheless observe that, just as the practice of abolition led to systematic improvements 
in conditions for the sympathetic and veridical representation of blacks, so too has same-
sex marriage created conditions for a richer and more sympathetic body of social 
relationships between heterosexuals and the gay community.  To the extent that such 
relationships figure crucially in enabling us properly to think and feel about the concerns 
of others around us, we can see the practical changes associated with same-sex marriage 
as fostering a distinctive kind of epistemological improvement.  And, unlike the example 
of abolition, marital rights for same-sex couples were achieved under conditions that 
much more closely approximate democracy as defined above.  Although the gay 
community was, and continues to be, systemically marginalized in many aspects of social 
life, their achievement of marital rights was nonetheless dependent on the exercise of 
core democratic rights to speech, protest, and voting.  And it was likewise dependent on 
the fact that homosexuals were so widely represented in diverse civic, economic, 
political, and artistic walks of life. While Anderson is correct to emphasize the way in 
                                                
23 The Ethical Project, pp. 164-65 
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which practice improves our grasp of the consequences of acting on our moral beliefs, 
experimental practice yields a further epistemological advantage.  To test out a moral 
claim in practice is to have one’s representations of other people, along with their 
distinctive projects and concerns, shaped by the particular social order of which that 
claim’s practice is partly constitutive.  In this respect, I want to argue, experimentation 
can be morally transformative in a way that deliberation, and communication more 
generally, cannot.  I turn now to considering the advantages of democratic 
experimentation over these alternatives, and then to offering a fuller conception of the 
experimentalist model. 
 
3. Emotion and Deliberation in Judgments of Social Morality 
Standard conceptions of deliberative democracy (DD) hold that the primary 
mechanism for belief change in a properly functioning democracy is a free and 
egalitarian exchange of reasons.24  As a number of critics of DD have pointed out, the 
problem with insisting on the normative priority of reasons is that it contradicts a large 
and growing body of psychological evidence indicative of a crucial role for the emotions 
in moral judgment.25  Thus, for example, Haidt’s well known experiments suggest that 
our rational judgments about morality reflect the outputs of prior, unconscious affective 
                                                
24 Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," Amy Gutmann and Dennis F. Thompson, 
Democracy and Disagreement: Why Moral Conflict Cannot be Avoided in Politics and What 
Should Be Done About It (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1996), Habermas, Between Facts and 
Norms 
25 Cheryl Hall, "Recognizing the Passion in Deliberation: Toward a More Democratic Theory of 
Deliberative Democracy," Hypatia 22 (2007): 81-95, Sharon Krause, Civil Passions: Moral 
Sentiment and Democratic Deliberation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 
Michael E. Morrell, Empathy and Democracy: Feeling, Thinking, and Deliberation (University 
Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2010) 
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systems.26  Specific moral emotions such as disgust, anger, and compassion also appear to 
serve as “moral amplifiers” which prioritize particular kinds of moral considerations over 
others.27  Consistent with these results, the moral condemnation of behaviors (such as 
smoking) is associated with the social development of predispositions to feel negative 
emotions in response.28  Likewise, a range of studies show that manipulations in the 
physiological manifestations of emotion – such as facial expressions or bodily position – 
predict relevant changes in moral judgment.29  Finally, a significant body of research 
indicates that the impairment of emotional capacities is closely associated with failures of 
moral judgment and, in some cases, an incapacity to reason more generally.30  Emotions 
thus seem to play a crucial role in the process of moral reasoning itself.  Whereas some 
traditional conceptions of moral emotions understand them as "brute" outputs of 
evolutionary hardwiring, a growing body of evidence indicates that they are in fact parts 
of complex learning systems that can supplement and inform rational judgment.31  
 It is also worth noting the ways in which the process of rational deliberation is itself 
guided and constrained by the emotional responses of participants.  Thus, a large body of 
experiments on social dilemmas indicates that cooperation is substantially and reliably 
                                                
26 Jonathan Haidt, "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to 
Moral Judgment," Psychological Review 108 (2001): 814-34 
27 Elizabeth J. Horberg, et al., "Emotions as Moral Amplifiers: An Appraisal Tendency Approach 
to the Influences of Distinct Emotions Upon Moral Judgment," Emotion Review 3 (2011): 237-44 
28 Ibid., p. 242 
29 Ibid., p. 241 
30 Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: 
Penguin, 1994), Shaun Nichols, "How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism, or Is it Irrational 
to Be Amoral?," The Monist 85 (2002): 285-304 
31 Peter Railton, "The Affective Dog and Its Rational Tale: Intuition and Attunement," Ethics 124 
(2014): 813-59 
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increased through face-to-face communication.32  This fact is indicative of the various 
ways in which the context, medium, and relationship between deliberators – all of which 
are mediated in important ways by emotions – bear on deliberative outcomes.  Likewise a 
range of studies show, not surprisingly, that the degree of scrutiny that a subject places on 
an argument is sensitive to such factors as the source’s attractiveness, her likeability, her 
power, her perceived similarity to the recipient, and her status as a member of the social 
majority or minority.33 Another body of work on “motivated reasoning” indicates the 
various ways in which the evaluation of reasons is itself driven by desires to appear 
competent and reasonable to others, desires which tend to bias subjects in favor of 
evidence that confirms existing views.34 
 As an alternative to DD, activist democrats such as Iris Marion Young and Lynn 
Sanders advocate moving beyond the deliberative ideal to accommodate forms of 
communication with vital non-rational elements, such as greeting, rhetoric, and 
storytelling.35 Likewise, theorists such as Sharon Krause, Michael Morrell, and Cheryl 
Hall have elaborated models of political deliberation that explicitly incorporate emotion 
as a core constituent.36  And more traditional deliberative democrats such as John Dryzek 
                                                
32 Tali Mendelberg, "The Deliberative Citizen: Theory and Practice," in Research in 
Micropolitics: Political Decisionmaking, Deliberation, and Participation, eds. Michael X. Delli 
Carpini, Leoni Huddy and Robert Shapiro (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 2002), p. 155 
33 Richard E. Petty and Duane T. Wegener, "Attitude Change: Multiple Roles for Persuasion 
Variables," in The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 1, eds. Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske 
and Gardner Lindzey (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998), pp. 25-27 
34 Mendelberg, "The Deliberative Citizen: Theory and Practice," pp. 168-69, Hugo Mercier and 
Dan Sperber, "Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments For an Argumentative Theory," Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences 34 (2011): 57-111 
35 Lynn M. Sanders, "Against Deliberation," Political Theory 25 (1997): 347-76, Iris Marion 
Young, "Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy," Political Theory 29 (2001): 670-90 
36 Hall, "Recognizing the Passion in Deliberation," Krause, Civil Passions: Moral Sentiment and 
Democratic Deliberation, Morrell, Empathy and Democracy: Feeling, Thinking, and 
Deliberation 
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and Guttman/Thompson have defended a place for more emotionally charged forms of 
communication when traditional deliberation proves inadequate.37 
 Broadening the deliberative paradigm so as to allow a valuable role for emotion and 
emotionally engaging modes of communication is an important improvement on classical 
DD.  It is important to note, however, that these emotional responses are outputs of a 
complex body of psychological dynamics that represent our social relationships with 
others.  To return to Dewey’s phrase, such responses are “saturated” with a particular 
social vantage point.  Among the most notable and well-documented of these dynamics is 
the tendency of individuals to conceptualize others as members of a common “in-group” 
that share vital characteristics with the subject, or instead as members of a moral “out-
group.”  Out-group categorization of this sort can translate into dehumanization, the 
attribution of lesser intellectual or emotional capacities, perceptions of untrustworthiness, 
reduced empathy, or a reduced sense of accountability, for example.38  Importantly, 
available evidence suggests that such representations are crucially shaped by the 
particularities of a subject’s personal history and social context.  Our capacity for 
empathy with the members of a given social group, for example, is significantly 
increased through positive personal interaction with that group.39 Cross-group friendships 
                                                
37 John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), Amy Gutmann and Dennis F. Thompson, Why Deliberative 
Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) 
38 Susan T. Fiske, "Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination," in The Handbook of Social 
Psychology Vol. 2, eds. Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske and Gardner Lindzey (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1998), Nick Haslam, "Dehumanization: An Integrative Review," Personality and 
Social Psychology Review 10 (2006): 252-64, Susan Opotow, "Moral Exclusion and Injustice: An 
Introduction," Journal of Social Issues 46 (2010): 1-20 
39 Jared Kenworthy, et al., "On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years After Allport," in On the 
Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years After Allport, eds. John Dovidio, Peter Glick and Laurie Rudman 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), Sara D. Hodges and Daniel M. Wegner, "Automatic and 
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also tend to reduce prejudice-related anxiety40 and negative cross-group attitudes more 
generally.41  Our conception of other groups’ moral considerability is, similarly, 
influenced by the ease with which we can think of exemplars from that group.42  
 Given the significance of individuals’ interactions with members of other groups in 
shaping group-based representations, it is not surprising that such representations are 
sensitive to broad social dynamics such as war, economic troubles, or political instability 
that shape and structure such interactions in crucial ways.43  Likewise, racial integration 
in institutional environments such as schools has been causally connected to reductions in 
implicit bias.44  Schools, in particular, seem to play a particularly crucial role in shaping 
citizens’ representations of other groups insofar as emotional associations with particular 
groups develop early in life.45  
 The general point toward which I have been working is this: The events that take 
place within deliberation, as well as the more emotionally engaged forms of 
communication that activist democrats envision, occur against the backdrop of each 
subject’s complex and often unconscious representation of her social world and its 
                                                                                                                                            
Controlled Empathy," in Empathic Accuracy, ed. William John Ickes (New York: Guilford Press, 
1997) 
40 Elizabeth Page-Gould and Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton, "With a Little Help From My Cross-
Group Friend: Reducing Anxiety in Intergroup Contexts Through Cross-Group Friendship," 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 95 (2008): 1080-94 
41 Linda R. Tropp and Mary A. Prenovost, "The Role of Intergroup Contact in Predicting 
Children's Inter-Ethnic Attitudes: Evience from Meta-Analytic and Field Studies," in Intergroup 
Attitudes and Relations in Childhood Through Adulthood, eds. Sheri R. Levy and Melanie Killen 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
42 Simon M. Laham, "Ease of Retrieval and the Moral Circle," Social Psychology 44 (2013): 33-
36 
43 Ervin Staub, "Psychology and Morality in Genocide and Violent Conflict: Perpetrators, Passive 
Bystanders, and Rescuers," in The Social Psychology of Morality: Exploring the Causes of Good 
and Evil, eds. Mario Mikulincer and Philip R. Shaver (Washington DC: American Psychological 
Association, 2012) 
44 Heidi McGlothlin and Melanie Killen, "How Social Experience is Related to Children's 
Intergroup Attitudes," European Journal of Social Psychology 40 (2010): 625-34 
45 Frances E. Aboud, Children and Prejudice (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988) 
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constituents.  Consistent with Dewey's emphasis on the interrelationship of emotions and 
rationality in moral judgment, those representations are expressed in part through 
affective responses that shape the conceptualization of important social dilemmas, the 
attitudes towards groups involved in those dilemmas, and the manner in which reasons, 
arguments, and emotional expression are processed.  Likewise, consistent with Dewey’s 
suggestion that our evaluation is “saturated” by the perspective of those around us, these 
representations are a function of each subject’s distinctive social and institutional 
environment, combined with the particularities of her life history: her friends, 
acquaintances, formative experiences, etc.  Contrary to accounts of democracy that 
conceptualize moral change principally as a consequence of political and moral 
communication (rational or otherwise), these experiential bases of moral judgment are 
not, in general, gained as part of an intentional effort to refine our moral beliefs.  Most of 
that experience is simply what happens to us as we go about the business of being people 
within a distinctive social environment.   
One crucial implication of this point is that deliberation alone will tend in 
important cases to be too conservative insofar as our moral beliefs are shaped by the very 
social practices of which they are supposed to yield evaluations.  The case of same-sex 
marriage once again illustrates this point nicely.  The endorsement of differential 
marriage rights based on sexual identity has been sustained by the denial of gay family 
rights itself, i.e., by the suppression of gay family values and experience in social life.  To 
consider another example, the question of what taxation scheme should count as just is 
sensitive to the way in which different economic classes represent the occupants of other 
rungs of the economic ladder.  Opposition to redistributive measures, for example, is 
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often fueled by attributions of laziness, poor motivation, and other moralized negative 
character traits to the poor.46  Those perceptions, however, are fueled in part by class-
based social segregation which, in turn, is a consequence of the very tax structure whose 
moral status is in question.  Here is one more example: opposition to laws that would 
make it easier for women to remain in the workplace during their child-bearing years is 
partly fueled by the perception that women’s work/family decisions are driven by their 
own preferences rather than structural economic pressures, a notion that is closely 
tethered to deeper conceptions of women’s natural domesticity.47  Women’s very capacity 
to realize and express their identity in the workplace, however, is itself dependent on the 
legal structures in question.  The social experiences that shape our prevailing 
representations of women are thus distorted in a way that undermines the case for change. 
The general problem exemplified in each of these cases is that the outputs of 
deliberation about moral change tend to reflect a social outlook that is itself substantially 
constructed by status quo norms and institutions.  In response to this problem, activist 
democrats and others are correct to seek a vital role for non-deliberative forms of 
communication.  But the lesson of the empirical work above is that our response to such 
communication tends to be constrained by our social environment in much the same way 
that our reasoning is.  Dewey's own writings sometimes seem to suggest that thought 
experiments – in effect, moral imagination – might suffice for the purposes of inquiry 
(see the quotation on the top of p. 5 for example).48  Certainly, it seems plausible that 
                                                
46 Catherine Cozzarelli, et al., "Attitudes Toward the Poor and Attributions for Poverty," Journal 
of Social Issues 57 (2001): 207-27 
47 Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989) 
48 I thank Philip Kitcher for raising this point.  For a particularly rich take on this aspect of 
Dewey, see Steven Fesmire, John Dewey and Moral Imagination (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 2003). 
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moral imagination provides a crucial supplement to other modes of evaluation.  But if our 
emotional and rational responses to moral questions are bounded in important respects by 
extant social norms and institutions, there is every reason to think that our responses to 
imaginary scenarios will be similarly bounded.  Changing our moral response to the 
world thus requires more than imagination or communication.  It requires change in the 
social environment itself. 
 Deliberative democrats could try to rescue their view by holding that, were the 
norms of rational deliberation actually satisfied, citizens’ judgments would not be 
susceptible to the sorts of emotional influences that bias them in favor of an unjust status 
quo.  Consistent with Dewey’s view, however, the research cited above offers evidence 
that emotions play a pervasive causal role in moral judgment that at least functions 
closely in tandem with reason.  That research casts some doubt on whether the rational 
deliberative ideal corresponds to a genuine psychological possibility.  Setting aside this 
point, suppose it is in fact the case that, under the ideal conditions described by 
deliberative democrats, our judgments would transcend the sorts of emotional influences 
I have described above.  Even if that is so, the historical episodes described above, 
combined with the empirical evidence I have cited, suggest that the deliberative ideal is at 
best deeply inadequate under the conditions that typically define episodes of major social 
transformation.  Insofar as DD aspires to offer normative guidance for the actions of 
democratic citizens and institutions, and not only an abstract characterization of social 
morality, this would be a major failing.49   
                                                
49 I do not mean to imply that an “abstract characterization of social morality” could not be 
valuable independently of guiding action in the real world.  G.A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and 
Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), for example, provides interesting 
arguments that it could.  Nonetheless, even the most idealized versions of DD appear to present 
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4. The Role of Deliberation and Communication in Democratic Experiments 
 To refine our previous definition, we can understand democratic experiments as 
deliberate interventions in our social practice, under democratic conditions, that 
precipitate significant changes in the social experience of citizens, changes which are 
premised on the hypothesis that they will advance the epistemic perspective of citizens on 
questions of moral value.  Citizens’ epistemic perspective in this regard is improved to 
the extent that changes in their information and emotional dispositions yield what I 
characterized earlier as more veridical and sympathetic representations of other members 
of their community. 
 Though I have argued for the inadequacy of deliberation and communication as a 
basis for moral judgment, I do not mean to exclude a vital role for either in public 
inquiry.  The gay rights movement, certainly, was crucially propelled by compelling 
narrative, highly public legal deliberations, and dramatic moments of civic action among 
other things.  Characteristic of this and other moments of important social change is a 
kind of incubatory period during which a critical mass of social support gathers through 
social communication.  Experimental interventions are thus made possible in large part 
through a communicative process in which the relevant social “hypothesis” is formulated, 
i.e., in which a conception of grievances and a proposed social remedy are developed.  
Deliberation also plays a crucial role in the ongoing evaluation of the moral 
consequences of a given social intervention. 
                                                                                                                                            
themselves as a general normative framework for democracy, and the view has overwhelmingly 
been interpreted as a practically viable model.  See, for example, James Fishkin, When The 
People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009).  In any case, I take real-world action-guidance to at least be a major desideratrum of 
a democratic theory and thus I take a significant failure on that count to be a major flaw of DD. 
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 Taking the proper role of deliberation and communication into account, a full 
experimentalist model of social progress is as follows:  Standing social arrangements lead 
to a significant experience of frustration within some subset of the population.  The raw 
experience of frustration leads to an increase in social deliberative reflection and 
communication concerning the source and validity of the frustration, alongside a 
consideration of social changes that would resolve a mature conception of the problem.  
Through rational and emotional mechanisms, social communication draws the support of 
some significant portion of the population for possible social interventions.  Such 
communication is effective in drawing support to a greater or lesser degree depending on 
the distinctive rational and emotional constitution of various constituencies, some of 
whom will be more capable than others of a sympathetic and veridical representation of 
the relevant grievances.  The growth in support for possible interventions culminates in 
the organization of available power – legislative, judicial, and social – for producing 
experimental changes.  Early changes might arise primarily in a localized way such as, 
for example, modified norms of a particular workplace or classroom.  As greater social 
power becomes available (for example, if the possibility of a systematic challenge in the 
judicial system becomes viable) experimental changes may be pursued on a larger scale.  
The implementation of change leads to further deliberative reflection, the results of which 
play a vital causal role in stabilizing experimental interventions as new social norms, 
initiating modifications, or identifying crucial grievances that lead to their rejection. 
Thus, an experimental model of social progress holds that deliberative rationality must be 
augmented (not discarded from political life) by social action that facilitates improved 
emotional representations of other social groups. 
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 Of course, the very idea of experimentation entails the possibility of failure.  Some 
social interventions will fail to address the grievances that motivate them, and some will 
introduce changes that are morally worse than the practices they aim to rectify.  This 
raises an important worry: if our moral judgments are heavily shaped by extant social 
norms and institutions, won't we tend to endorse experimental outcomes no matter how 
morally regressive or progressive?  Consider an alternative world in which the Civil 
Rights movement was replaced with the Even-Worse-Racial-Segregation movement.  In 
a world of even-worse-racial-segregation, wouldn't we tend to view segregation as even-
more-just as a consequence of the even-more-dehumanizing social context thereby 
created?  If experimentation is to provide a model for social inquiry, we need a reason to 
think that it offers us, not just a pathway for changing social consciousness, but some 
reliable means of distinguishing between morally progressive and non-progressive 
changes.50 
 The claim that democratic moral experimentation sufficiently tends to produce 
moral progress depends most fundamentally on the dual premise that, under democratic 
conditions, (i) progressive changes initiated through experiment sufficiently tend to 
stabilize as endorsed features of the social order, while (ii) non-progressive changes 
initiated through experiment sufficiently tend not to stabilize as endorsed features of the 
social order.  Specifying precisely an appropriate time frame for (i) and (ii) is difficult, 
but the psychological mechanisms involved in belief change depend on reforms that play 
out gradually and often span multiple generations.  Let's take the second premise first.  In 
democracies, non-progressive changes will tend to destabilize insofar as social groups 
                                                
50 I thank Dan Meyers for pressing this worry on me in a particularly forceful way. 
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(and individuals) have the capacity to recognize threats to their well being that originate 
in social norms and institutions, and to mobilize sufficient power for change.  While that 
capacity to recognize such threats is not guaranteed by human nature, it is supported by 
liberal-democratic institutions that encourage independent and critical reflection on the 
social order and the nature of one’s own good, and that support group-level collaboration 
and organization in such reflection.51  Democracies likewise guarantee basic rights and 
powers that enable groups of citizens to articulate and mobilize grievances through the 
use of political and social resources.  These rights and powers do not guarantee that non-
progressive changes will always succumb to effective opposition (no set of political or 
social institutions could offer any such guarantee), but they create conditions that are 
maximally favorable for the articulation and mobilization of legitimate grievances against 
the status quo.  
 It is important to observe here that democracies function well in this regard, not by 
maximizing the epistemic powers of every individual citizen but, rather, by establishing 
conditions in which: (1) for any given moral injustice, it is likely that at least some 
among those most seriously aggrieved will be positioned to recognize and articulate that 
injustice and (2) those who do recognize injustice will be positioned to recruit others 
through communication, and to mobilize social power around their cause.  In effect, 
democracies tend to destabilize unjust practices by creating conditions that leverage the 
powers of insightful, articulate, and resourceful individuals (and groups of individuals) 
who bear the gravest consequences of injustice.   
 Regarding the first premise, progressive changes will tend to stabilize insofar as 
                                                
51 Allen Buchanan, "Political Liberalism and Social Epistemology," Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 32 (2004): 95-130, Michael Fuerstein, “Epistemic Trust and Liberal Justification,” 
Journal of Political Philosophy 21 (2013): 179-99 
Michael Fuerstein, “Democratic Experiments” 
 27 
moral improvements tend sufficiently to be accompanied by epistemological advances 
that diminish the force of unwarranted objections to those improvements.  In effect, we 
are looking for some reason to think that moral progress tends to cause epistemic 
progress.  In the case of same-sex marriage, I have argued that progress has been won 
because changes in our social practice enabled the more sympathetic and veridical 
representation of a valid but previously marginalized perspective.  My suggestion is thus 
that, at least in this salient case, the institutional changes that realized moral progress also 
played a crucial causal role in realizing epistemic progress.  On this hypothesis, social 
beliefs have begun to stabilize in favor of same-sex marriage rights because the 
institutional and social changes involved in realizing those rights also enhanced the 
public’s capacity to recognize their moral validity on appropriate grounds.   
 These observations help to clarify the sense in which democratic experiments are 
indeed democratic.  Like the case of racial integration and a number of others, same-sex 
marriage is an instance in which the radically anti-majoritarian institution of the U.S. 
Supreme Court played a crucial role.  One might very reasonably suggest that, as such, 
these were technocratic rather than democratic experiments and that, indeed, democracy 
is in some sense precisely what stood in the way in these examples.  However, as I noted 
early on, I follow Dewey in interpreting democracy as a broad ideal that is compatible 
with – and indeed, that typically requires – measures of technocracy and 
constitutionalism.  Pursuing the details of these issues would go beyond the scope of this 
paper.  Nonetheless, the general idea is to see majority rule as one important procedural 
tool among others that serves more fundamental values of public equality and social 
freedom.  Those values are generally well-served by majority or plurality rule, but also 
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require widely recognized exceptions that protect basic rights, check mob psychology, 
and enable the effective expression of minority concerns.  From this point of view, 
democratic experiments are democratic insofar as they depend on the various levers of 
power by which democracies enable diverse citizens to mobilize valid grievances.  While 
that kind of mobilization depends in crucial cases on anti-majoritarian institutions like the 
Supreme Court, it depends more fundamentally on the equitable distribution of social and 
political power by which democracies are distinguished from aristocratic and 
authoritarian alternatives.52   
 Nonetheless, I do want to go so far as to claim that democratic conditions are the 
only conditions in which interventions in practice can promote progress.  The case of 
abolition discussed earlier, for example, clearly suggests otherwise.  The point is that 
democratic conditions are those in which the epistemological advantages of 
experimentation are most reliably achieved.  In this respect, the idea of democratic 
experimentation constitutes a normative ideal, i.e., a characterization of the conditions 
and manner in which social inquiry tends to go best.   
 But, to return to the same-sex marriage case: is it representative?  Or is it a special 
outlier?  I doubt that there is any perfectly general argument linking up moral progress 
with epistemic progress in the moral domain.  We can observe, nonetheless, that most 
salient instances of moral progress are cases in which the capacities of some social group 
to freely articulate and pursue ideals central to its members’ welfare are in some crucial 
respect improved.  And we can observe, likewise, that improving capacities of that kind 
tends to entail systematic social changes that foster that group’s greater participation in 
                                                
52 All that said, my point is not to decisively vindicate the general notion of democracy on which I 
am relying.  It suffices for my purposes to show that it is at least a plausible and well-motivated 
conception. 
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social and political life.  That kind of improved participation, in turn, facilitates 
improvements in the epistemic perspective of other groups on their concerns. 
 Here are a couple of additional examples of moral experimentation that illustrate 
this phenomenon.  I’ll start with the case of racial desegregation, which I mentioned at 
the paper’s outset, and which has some relatively obvious parallels with the case of gay 
rights.  The systematic desegregation of American schools beginning in the 1950s, along 
with a number of other integrationist measures (such as the Civil Rights Act and the 
Voting Rights Act), precipitated a series of very significant shifts in the American social 
fabric that enabled whites to form more meaningful social relationships with blacks, and 
to encounter blacks in a more dynamic, less-demeaning range of social contexts.53  The 
crucial point here is not only that racial integration can be nicely modeled as an instance 
of progressive experiment (albeit a-still-radically-incomplete experiment).  The point is 
to highlight the way in which the practice of integration has facilitated the more 
sympathetic and veridical representation of the perspective of black citizens by 
reordering the social conditions in which interracial relationships were formed.  The 
example thus nicely illustrates the way in which moral progress (in this case highly 
imperfect) tends to cause epistemological progress (in this case also highly imperfect).54  
 A less obvious kind of example, perhaps, is the case of environmental values.55  The 
                                                
53 For a comprehensive overview, see Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. 
Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality (New York: Knopf, 1976) 
54 For a thorough account of the moral and epistemological significance of racial integration in 
general, see Elizabeth Anderson, The Imperative of Integration (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2010).  And for a helpful interpretation of Dewey's own views on the 
psychological and social underpinnings of racism see Gregory Pappas, "Dewey's Philosophical 
Approach to Racial Prejudice," Social Theory and Practice (1996): 47-65. 
55 Like the other examples I’ve discussed, this one only serves my purposes if this is in fact a case 
of progress.  In this context, I’m going to assume that without argument.  What if it isn’t a case of 
progress?  If it isn’t a case of progress, then the implications of this case are at least problematic 
Michael Fuerstein, “Democratic Experiments” 
 30 
extent to which, and particular respects in which, human beings attribute moral value to 
the natural environment has evolved significantly alongside the social practices which 
have governed our relationship with nature.  One example of this is the preservation and 
promotion of wild spaces as objects of intrinsic beauty and places of recreation.  The 
extent to which we see those spaces as objects of moral value above and apart from, say, 
narrow conceptions of economic productivity is dependent in part on the extent to which 
we have opportunities to experience the distinctive majesty of those spaces.  The 
development of protected wilderness areas, alongside the promotion of wilderness 
recreation as restorative and intrinsically enriching, has facilitated a kind of human 
relationship with nature that promotes an emotional capacity to appreciate its value.  At 
the same time, the fact that so many of the effects of human civilization remain radically 
removed from the normal course of our experience (at least in much of the world) 
presumably plays a crucial role in our continued tendency to undervalue nature from a 
moral point of view.  From this perspective, initiatives such as the “local food” 
movement can be seen as efforts, not only to provide citizens with more relevant 
information, but also to change the everyday manner in which they relate to the natural 
world, its products, and some of its most direct stakeholders.  
 
5.  Is experimentalism illiberal? 
 Even if I am right that experimentation is epistemologically vital, the idea that we 
                                                                                                                                            
for my claim that experimentation tends to be epistemologically reliable.  Pursuing that line of 
reasoning will introduce complexities that I cannot address here.  Still, my argument only 
presupposes that, in some very general way, our moral perspective on the natural environment is 
improved relative to whatever it was, say, one hundred years ago, and that this improvement is 
itself causally related to the protection of wild spaces and natural resources.  I hope that isn’t too 
much of a stretch for most readers. 
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might change the moral minds of others by forcing coercive measures through the 
government seems to rest uneasily with a liberal tradition that emphasizes rational 
autonomy and consent as conditions of legitimacy.  These two conditions raise related but 
distinct concerns, which I will now consider in turn. 
 The worry about rational autonomy is that, to the extent that reformers can cause 
changes of belief through interventions in the social environment, their experiments 
amount to a kind of psychological manipulation that subverts the rational will.  This 
worry is exacerbated by the fact that the primary mechanism for belief change in 
experiments is the transformation of our non-rational (insofar as the emotions are non-
rational56) constitution. 
 In response to this worry it is important to observe, first, that if the empirical 
perspective marshaled above is correct, then our moral perspective is causally shaped by 
our social environment and emotional constitution no matter what.  Recommending that 
we make political decisions by seeking the rational approval of all citizens is fair enough.  
But what we can be brought to rationally approve is, as I have argued, deeply bound to 
the social and emotional context in which rational evaluation takes place.  In that respect, 
it is not clear that experimental changes in the social environment contribute some new 
kind of rationality-subverting cause that wouldn't otherwise be present.   
 However, even if it is unavoidable that social and emotional factors shape our 
moral judgments, democratic experiments involve changing these factors in ways 
intended to achieve a particular psychological outcome.  That suggests that the charge of 
manipulation applies in a way that it would not to ordinary deliberative reflection.  
                                                
56 Of course, for many cognitivists about emotion, this apparent gap between reason and the 
emotions is a non-issue.  See, for example, Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The 
Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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Nonetheless, that charge is inconsistent with the fact that, as I recently argued, 
democratic experiments involve a process through which the public exercises a reliable 
capacity to discriminate between progressive and non-progressive innovations.  The 
reliable capacity in question is one that proceeds through rather than around full and free 
powers of rational reflection.  For example, racial desegregation has stabilized precisely 
because, once implemented, its moral advantages have withstood rational scrutiny under 
conditions of deliberative engagement.  Were it unable to withstand proper rational 
scrutiny, one can reasonably anticipate that – for reasons argued in the previous section – 
objections would be successfully articulated by a durable minority at first, and ultimately 
mobilized more broadly through experimentation.  Notably, if we cannot reasonably 
assume that such objections would be articulated, then that does not bode well for 
rationalist alternatives to experimentalism either.  
 So the charge of psychological manipulation fails because, in the cases where 
democratic experimentation is epistemologically significant, implementing experimental 
change x is (under democratic conditions) necessary but not sufficient to determine that x 
will be stably endorsed, and because (under democratic conditions) x will in fact only be 
stably endorsed if it survives rational deliberative scrutiny.  Again: experimentalism 
holds, not that experiment supplants the role of rational deliberation but, rather, that it 
supplements such deliberation to yield epistemological advances that would not 
otherwise be possible, at least on a mass social scale.  And though experimentation 
involves changes in emotional causes that contribute to moral judgment, I have argued 
that under appropriate circumstances such causes inform rather than undermine rational 
faculties.   
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 I turn now to considering the worry that experimentalism is inconsistent with the 
liberal ideal of rational consent. To be sure, experimentalism entails that democratic 
norms and institutions gain their value in significant part from their tendency to cultivate 
minority opposition that initiates change in social practice.  And it underlines the crucial 
role of judicial, legislative, and social powers that do not always depend on earning 
majority support to effect practical change.  So experimentalism offers a general vision of 
democratic life that is less conciliatory in its decision-making procedures than some 
prominent conceptions of liberalism, that welcomes steadfast minority dissent as a 
condition of progress, and that predicts vigorous opposition in the early stages of social 
interventions that set the stage for moral change. 
 Thus, if rational consent entails that political powers must be used primarily as a 
consequence of rational deliberation that aims at consensus, then experimentalism is 
clearly not compatible with the rational consent condition.  In this respect, 
experimentalism echoes the activist view that, if we interpret the rational consent 
condition in overly strong terms, liberalism will have difficulty accommodating the 
morally indispensable role of oppositional politics.57  While I cannot pursue that issue at 
length, I will note here that a morally viable model of experimentation is intended to 
operate within the constraints of standard liberal individual rights – to speech, assembly, 
religion, lifestyle, etc. – and a conventional democratic procedural framework.  It 
proposes that acting against the will of a substantial opposition is often a necessary 
condition of progress, but it does not hold that one may do anything to others in the name 
of progress, or that we should disrespect or disregard the will of others in considering the 
                                                
57 Michael Fuerstein, “Democratic Consensus as an Essential Byproduct,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 22 (2014): 282-301 
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appropriateness of a given social intervention.   
 The extent to which experiments entail coercion seems to vary with the moral 
failure being remedied.  Thus, desegregation clearly leveraged minority power through 
the courts to effect significant coercion in its early stages (busing, for example).  In 
contrast, though same-sex marriage has cut significantly against the will of a largely 
religious opposition, its coercive effects have been indirect at worst.  They have played 
out mainly through undesired changes in the social fabric rather than political directives 
that directly require individuals to perform undesired actions.  And although both of these 
cases have turned crucially on anti-majoritarian court decisions at some point, it is 
important to observe that progress has hinged just as much on a dynamic interaction 
between social beliefs and practice.  Thus, in the same-sex marriage case, public ballot 
referenda have played a crucial role in creating new legislation, initiatives which in turn 
seem to have steadily eroded public opposition.  As public opposition has eroded, in turn, 
yet more legislation could be passed.  This sort of toggling between the reform of belief 
and the reform of practice counters the suggestion that democratic experiments involve 
an impassioned minority imposing its view without regard for the opposition.  On the 
contrary, successful experiments typically involve initial, restricted interventions (pilot 
experiments?) that recruit broad public deliberation and participation to shape yet further 
such interventions.  Even if experimentation requires action in the face of significant 
opposition, success can only be sustained if (the bulk of) that opposition is won over 
under conditions of freedom and reflection.  From that point of view, legal measures that 
entrench new rights and institutions can and ought to make appropriate concessions to 
opponents.  The legalization of same-sex marriage is compatible, for example, with 
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carving out exceptions for religious institutions that do not wish to participate in such 
marriages.  Coercion can be minimized through careful reflection on the appropriate 
scope and scale of moral innovation in a given social context. 
  
7. Conclusion 
  Drawing on Dewey’s foundational perspective, I’ve articulated an experimentalist 
model of moral progress and have argued for its advantages over prominent deliberative 
and activist alternatives.  On my view, the advantage of experimentalism is that it can 
best accommodate the distinctive role that emotions play in our judgments about social 
morality and, likewise, the role that social norms and institutions play in shaping those 
emotions.  It also better explains some salient features of moral progress including, most 
notably, the fact that social belief tends to lag significantly behind social action.  Though 
I don’t focus on this above, experimentalism also nicely explains the typically slow pace 
of moral progress (because institutional change, and change in emotional dispositions, is 
a slow process), as well as the dependency of progress on generational change (because 
childhood experiences play a disproportionate role in shaping our emotional dispositions 
towards others social groups58).  The value of the experimentalist model, however, is not 
only explanatory.  I have argued that democratic experimentation is a reliable route, over 
extended periods of time, to moral improvement.  The account given is not a blueprint for 
every aspect of democratic life.  But I have nonetheless tried to capture its distinctive and 
significant features as a general framework, particularly in contrast to salient theoretical 
alternatives. 
                                                
58 Aboud, Children and Prejudice 
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 Here is one final caveat.  Although I have shown how a range of significant cases 
can be modeled in experimentalist terms, it would be surprising if every interesting 
instance of moral progress could be fruitfully modeled in those terms.  Certainly, it is 
doubtful that all epistemic failures on matters of social morality require the same kind of 
massive intervention in social practice as that of same-sex marriage, racial integration, or 
our care for the natural environment did.  In some cases, it may be enough simply to 
facilitate more communication and reflection of the sort that DD recommends.  The 
model of experimentation will be most apt where status quo social practice tends to 
facilitate detached, objectifying, dehumanizing, or exclusionary attitudes between social 
groups.  I have appealed to a range of examples as evidence that such cases constitute a 
large share of our significant moral dilemmas, but there are inevitably going to be 
interesting exceptions.  So democratic experimentation is best understood as a major and 
essential form of social inquiry rather than a model that encompasses all valuable forms 
of such inquiry.  There is room for a measure of pluralism here. 
